--- title: "Niv 0.3.54" description: "What changed in Niv for Mac 0.3.54, released 2026-10-10." canonical: https://niv.md/changelog/0-3-54 language: en last_updated: 2026-10-10 --- # Niv 0.3.54 2026-10-10 - A note's History tab finds the same overlaps as Home - The encrypted invitation links to the encryption page - What is and isn't encrypted, on an unlisted page - Concurrent offline edits in an encrypted note are recorded as an overlap - A note in an encrypted Space gets no content row and no plaintext content.touch - A member of an encrypted Space receives its notes and folders - A Space waiting for a member is asked again, a member let in catches up, and plaintext_left counts only unsealed values - Every Space an enabled account owns ends up encrypted - An emailed community invitation binds to the verified address - Every note procedure goes through the one access door - Only the people who can let others in ask who is waiting - The sealed-name client forwards calls synchronously - The encryption surfaces get their polish - End-to-end encryption is enabled per account, at runtime - The interpreter probe waits for stderr long enough to name a missing interpreter - An encrypted restore says its history follows on sync, and the History list meets contrast - A device is named after its Mac until it is renamed - A failed copy of a pasted sealed image is tried again - A sealed image pasted from another Space is copied into this one - The desktop says Ajustes everywhere - Emails speak the recipient's language - The encrypting stage starts and resumes migrations and names the note that stopped one - A migration retires every public upload it replaced, in confirmed chunks - Encrypted history: the diff checks generations from the base, and Home replays incrementally - A second agent identifier for two-instance proofs - An encrypted Space's owner can retire the rest of its replaced public uploads - Encrypted invitations read as held on every desktop surface - Encrypted notes have versions, diffs, overlaps and since-your-last-visit on the desktop - The migration re-uploads a note's public images sealed - Sealed uploads expire sooner, abandoned ones are swept daily, and a reaped upload cannot be committed - Notifications, emails and invitation reads carry no names in encrypted Spaces - One migration pull at a time; a note-named stop gives the Space back - The desktop publishes encrypted Spaces as device-built pages - The desktop uploads and downloads sealed attachments - The exported appTrpc has an explicit type - Name- and content-reading features refuse encrypted Spaces - One serialized config write per vault - Migration reads return the sealed-metadata snapshot and tag names - Encrypted Spaces publish by device upload - Engine mode read from status; the opened Space name is stored - A let-in invitee sees the Space name without restarting - Space names, history and Home open on the device - The server keeps sealed attachments in a private bucket - Devices show their names, with Rename - A device label is sealed only under the current account key - The pt-BR encrypted pass says cifradas - Note metadata, settings and rules are sealed on the device - Encrypted creates use device ids and sealed names - The socket typechecks again and clippy is clean - The desktop seals and opens attachments - Links are repaired on the device in encrypted Spaces - A stopped encrypted Sync now reads as failed - Sync now works in encrypted Spaces - Closed encrypted notes push their changes - The server keeps a sealed name per device - Sealed metadata moves the clock; rules take device ids - The desktop seals names before they reach the server - Closed encrypted notes catch up - The sync engine's encrypted mode - Encrypted Spaces take device-chosen ids - The desktop names its devices, sealed under the account key - Encrypted Spaces store sealed objects, not rows - An open encrypted note syncs through the relay - Unlock says why, and the upgrade promises no time - The desktop understands content.sealed.touch - Overlaps and restore checks run in the editor package - The 'Encrypting your Spaces' stage - Names stay opaque to the server in encrypted Spaces - The Space switcher never shows an empty emoji slot - Version diffs and per-block authors run in the editor package - Devices show when they were added and last seen - The desktop understands keys.touch in the Space feed - Key changes surface in the app - Letting members in, one person at a time - The desktop knows its own key fingerprint and device id - An earlier account key signs only within the generations it was granted - A refused recovery file is settled on disk - The desktop half of the encrypted relay - The server keeps Space key members, waiting lists and rotations - The server keeps each encrypted note's log - Removing a device calls the one server transaction - The encryption screens present the wrap proof - Removing a device is one server transaction - The server verifies the wrap-auth proof - A recovery file the server refused is deleted - A pin remembers whether the person let that member in - The desktop lets members in and rotates Space keys - The desktop proves the current wrap, and removing a device rotates the account key - The encryption screens run on the real key commands - Removing a member closes their open sockets - The desktop pins members' account keys - Wrap-auth proof for rotations and wrap replacements - Rust Space keys: seal and open encrypted updates - Rust rotation statements and sealed device labels - The key-change email speaks the app's words - An encrypted note's relay client and member snapshots - Removing a device changes the account key, and key changes say what they mean - The desktop typechecks again with the server's key routes - Server keys and wraps for end-to-end encryption - The desktop key manager: keychain, unlock and signed wraps - The encryption screens, built behind the switch - The desktop's Rust crypto module - One switch keeps end-to-end encryption off until it is ready - Logged errors never carry their message to PostHog, nor query params anywhere --- More: [Niv](https://niv.md/) · [About](https://niv.md/about) · [Contact](https://niv.md/contact) · [Privacy](https://niv.md/privacy) · [Encryption](https://niv.md/encryption) · [Terms](https://niv.md/terms) · [llms.txt](https://niv.md/llms.txt) · [Português (Brasil)](https://niv.md/pt-br/changelog/0-3-54)